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Abstract. In this paper shareholders face the trade-oﬀ between providing managers
with incentives to exert beneficial eﬀort and to engage in costly fraudulent activity. We solve
for the optimal compensation package, given that shareholders can either grant (restricted)
stock or stock options and given fixed average compensation costs. We show that if the nega-
tive eﬀect of fraud on the company’s value is suﬃciently large then stock based compensation
is optimal. Otherwise, stock option based compensation is optimal. Furthermore, we show
that the fraud to eﬀort ratio is increasing in the strike price and that the optimal strike price
is decreasing in the size of the negative eﬀects of fraud on the company’s value.
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1 Introduction
The 80s and 90s witnessed an explosion in stock option based compensation packages in the U.S.
(Murphy, 1999 and Hall, Murphy, 2003). Stock options are granted with the intent to align
interests of managers with those of shareholders and thus to reduce agency costs. Moreover, since
stock options are by definition bounded from below, they encourage executives risk taking and
thus mitigate executives risk aversion (Smith and Stulz, 1985). The popularity of stock options
has also been encouraged by a conflicting accounting and tax treatment. Companies where allowed
to deduct the entire expense of the option for tax purposes while not writing it oﬀ against profits.1
Over the past few years the proportion of pay delivered through stock options declined2 . A
Recent survey by Pearl Meyer and Partners for the New York Times documents a reduction in the
value of options granted from 66% to 31% of total remuneration, while restricted stock and long
term incentive plans (LTIP) over the same period increased from 14% to 30% . Thus, the current
trend in corporate compensation practice is to switch from stock options to alternative compensa-
tion schemes such as, for example restricted stocks. The most famous example is Microsoft, which
previously was one of the largest users of employee stock options.
One justification for this change in corporate compensation practice is the relative cost of
employee stock options. If a managers is risk averse, then stock options are poor instruments to
align shareholder goals with those of managers. While stock options are priced in a risk neutral
and arbitrage free way, managers value stock options less because of their risk aversion (Hall and
Murphy, 2000, 2003). Options have also been criticized since they boost short term gains but
often neglect long term performance, leading also to the problem of finding the optimal vesting
period.
1 A new statement by the Fianancial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requires firms to expense employee
stock option at the grant-date fair value for both public comanies (starting from 15 June, 2005) and non-public
companies (starting 15 December 2005).
2 See also Hall, Murphy (2003).
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The recent wave of accounting scandals such as, for example Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and
Xerox, hints to a strong tie between executive compensation package and fraudulent behavior.
Compensation schemes are designed to induce eﬀort but they may also induce costly fraudu-
lent activity (see Goldman and Slezak, 2005). Self-interested manager may engage in earnings
misrepresentation and manipulation, or fraudulent information dissemination to inflate the short
term stock price and thus also his compensation and wealth. This often occurs at the expense of
company’s long term performance.
In the present paper we are interested in the relationship between executive’s incentives to
manage earnings3 and their compensation package. Shareholders face the trade-oﬀ between
providing managers with incentives to exert beneficial eﬀort and to engage in costly fraudulent
activity. We solve for the optimal compensation package, given that the shareholders can either
grant (restricted) stock or stock options and given fixed average compensation costs. We consider
two agents, one being an eﬀort averse manager and the other being a representative shareholder.
Both individuals are risk neutral. In assuming risk-neutrality we eliminate the trade-oﬀ share-
holders face between providing the manager with incentives and insurance and thus we focus on
the trade-oﬀ between eﬀort and fraudulent behavior4 . Manager and shareholder face diﬀerent
time horizons. While the shareholder is interested in the long run value, manager’s compensa-
tion is a function of the short run value. In our model the manager can boost the short term
cash flow either by increasing eﬀort or manipulating earnings. Whereas increasing his eﬀort, the
manager can boost the long run company’s value, earning manipulations in the present paper are
assumed to reduce its long-run value5 . We show that the fraud to eﬀort ratio is an increasing
3 Earnings management can be classified into accounting and real value manipulation (Lev, 2003). The former
occurs without aﬀecting the cash flow or other real dimensions of the company, while the latter consists of activities
such as timing of sales or investments that aﬀect reported earnings.
4 See also Baglioni and Colombo (2004) and Kadan and Yang (2005).
5 Several paper document the negative relationship between earnings manipulation and its negative eﬀects on
future stock price. Chan et al (2005) using accounting accruals as a proxy for the quality of reported earnings
find a strong evidence of earnings manipulations in firms with the largest accruals and that accruals are negatively
related to future stock market returns. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) show how issuers of initial public oﬀerings
(IPOs) with unusually high accrual in the year of issue experience poor stock performance in the subsequent three
years. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) provide evidence that pre-issue earnings management by seasoned equity
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function of the strike price. Thus, the larger the strike price, the more the executive engages
in earnings management relative to beneficial eﬀort. We find a threshold level for the long run
negative eﬀects of fraud such that for larger values stock based compensation is optimal while for
lower values stock option based compensation is optimal. This threshold level is increasing in the
fraud-detection probability, the punishment in case of detection and in the eﬀectiveness of eﬀort,
while it is decreasing in the eﬀectiveness of fraud. Furthermore, we show that the optimal strike
price is decreasing in the size of the long run negative eﬀects of fraud on the company’s value.
Recent empirical literature on the relationship between managers’ compensation package and
earnings management evidences a significantly, positive association between option based com-
pensation packages and earnings management. Burns and Kedia (2005) investigate earning re-
statements of 215 firms compared with a control sample of firms matched by industry and size.
The authors find strong evidence that higher incentives from stock options are associated with
a higher propensity to misreport and also with a higher magnitude of misreporting. Further-
more, they find that equity, restricted stock and LTIP dot not have any significant impact on the
propensity and magnitude to misreport. Gao and Shrieves (2002) investigate the relationship be-
tween earnings management intensity, as measured by the absolute value of discretionary current
accruals scaled down by asset size, and managers’ compensation package6 . They find a positive
relationship between earnings management and stock option based compensation, while they find
a weaker support for a positive association between earnings management and restricted stock.
Bergstresser and Philippon (2005) consider accruals-based measures of earnings management and
find that periods of high accruals coincide with unusually large options exercise of CEOs and with
sale of large quantities of shares by other insiders7 . Jensen (2003) argues that discontinuities,
issuers, as reflected in discretionary accruals, explains future underperformance in stock returns. See also Jensen
(2003).
6 Accruals represent the diﬀerence between a company’s accounting earnings and its underlying cash flow.
7 Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2004) compare the performance of 50 firms accused of accounting fraud by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996 - 2003 with firms not accused of fraud
during the same period. They find that the likelihood of fraud is positively associated with the level of stock-based
compensation, the proportion of stock-based compensation (stock-based mix) and the sensitivity of executives’
stock-based wealth to a change in stock price. Johnson, Ryan and Tian (2003) stuy a sample of firms subject to
3
kinks and other non-linearities in the pay-for-performance function provide incentives for man-
agers and employee to lie and to game the system8 . Furthermore he discusses how the boosting
of present day compensation may lead to a long run reduction in the firm’s value.9
A growing literature studies the relationship between executive compensation and fraudulent
behavior. Goldman and Slezak (2005), restricting their analysis to stock based compensation,
study the link between executive compensation and fraudulent misreporting. They find that the
optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity which balances the provision of eﬀort and fraud. Baglioni
and Colombo (2004) in a costly state verification approach show that a incentive compatible
contract, where both incentive alignment and truthful revelation of the firm value are satisfied,
requires a (strictly) convex compensation function. Kadan and Yang (2005) investigate the trade-
oﬀ between incentive provision and executives earnings misreporting as a signalling game. Focusing
on the separating equilibrium they find that lowering the exercise price of stock induces more
misreporting.
The present paper is also related to Hall and Murphy (2000), where the authors determine
the strike price providing the largest incentives and Oded et. al (2004), where the problem of the
optimal strike price for an eﬀort averse executive is addressed.
In Section 2 the model is introduced and the main results are stated. Section 3 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider an economy consisting of 3 time periods: 1, 2 and 3. We consider times 1 and 2 to
be the short run, while time 3 represents the long run. We consider two agents, one being a eﬀort
averse manager and the other being a representative shareholder. Both the manager as well as the
SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER). The authors find that executives at fraud firm face
significantly greater financial incentives steming from stock and options holdings. Moreover they find that during
fraud period, executives exercise also a larger fraction of vested options than do executives at control firms.
8 See also Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) for a discussion on earnings management and thresholds.
9 See also Jensen (2004).
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representative shareholder are risk neutral. In assuming risk-neutrality we eliminate the trade-oﬀ
shareholders face between providing the manager with incentives and insurance. In this way we
focus on the trade-oﬀ between eﬀort and fraud. The risk neutral interest rate is normalized to
zero. Throughout the paper random variables are indicated with tilde (e) while realized variables
are indicated without a tilde.
At time 1 the manager undertakes a risky project, whose fundamental value depends on the
eﬀort e ≥ 0 exerted in the same time period. Further, at time 1, the manager may inflate the
company’s short run value engaging in earnings management f ≥ 0. Let p be the exogenous
probability that fraud is detected before time period 3. Assuming that an instantaneous price
correction takes place if fraudulent behavior is discovered10 , we define the company’s value at
time 2
eS2 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
S + αe+ βf + eε2 with probability 1− p
S + αe+ eε2 with probability p (1)
where eε2 ∈ U [−h, h] is the random variable compounding project and market specific risk, its value
being realized at time 2. In (1) we implicitly assume that the event of detection is independent of
eε2.
While eﬀort increases the short run as well as the long run value of the company, earnings
management boost only its short run value while decreasing its long run value. Thus, we assume
that the company’s expected long run value is
E
³eS3´ = S + αe− δf (2)
where δf indicates the long run loss in profitability due to fraudulent behavior of the manager.
The shareholder defines the compensation package (λ,K), consisting in λ ≥ 0 stock options,
vesting at time 2, with strike price K ≥ 0. For K = 0 the shareholder grants (restricted) stock,
while for K > 0 he grants stock options. The Shareholder and the manager face diﬀerent time
10 Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2004) find that the value of the equity holdings of top managers accused of
fraud was substantially overstated prior to the revelation of the fraudulent behavior.
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horizons. We assume that stock options vest at time 2 and thus the executive is interested in the
short run value of the company. Probability p is therefore the probability of fraudulent behavior
being detected before executive’s stock options get vested. Executive’s compensation is defined as
fW2 = λeV2, where eV2 = neS2 −Ko+. Shareholders are interested in the company’s long run value,
i.e. E
³eS3´.
Eﬀort level e and the fraud level f are not observable. Fraudulent behavior does not directly
produce disutility such as eﬀort, but if the manager is caught then he has to pay a penalty, which
is increasing in the size of the misrepresentation f . Given the exogenous probability that fraud is
detected before the options get vested p and let P (f) = φf
2
2 be the penalty if fraudulent behavior
is observed, the executive’s expected utility is
E
³
U
³fW2´´ ≡ E ³fW2´− pφf2
2
− e
2
2
The shareholder defines the strike price K and the number of options granted, maximizing the
long run expected present value of the company such that the incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied. The shareholder’s problem can formally be stated as follows
max
K
E
³eS3´ (3)
s.t. e, f = argmaxE
³
U
³fW2´´ (4)
where (4) is the incentive compatibility constraint. This maximization problem is furthermore
constrained. We consider the case where the expected compensation costs are fixed to W and
thus determine the optimal compensation package (λ,K) which maximizes the long run expected
present value of the company (2). In this case the constraint reads
λE
³eV2´ =W (5)
where (5) is the project’s budget constraint. In what follows we assume that parameters are
such that the participation constraint is always satisfied, that is the executive’s expected utility
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is always larger than its outside option11 .
Once the budget constraint (5) is imposed, we can rewrite λ as a function of K. Consequently,
the problem of the shareholder reduces to finding the optimal strike price which maximizes the
long run value of the company (2).
In the following lemma we characterize the optimal fraud and eﬀort choice for the manager,
conditional on the contract (λ,K) , as resulting form the incentive compatibility constraint (4).
Lemma 1 Optimal eﬀort e and fraud f are both continuous, increasing in λ and decreasing
in K.
Thus, an increase in the number of options granted increases the eﬀort as well as the fraud
level, while an increase in the strike price decreases the eﬀort as well as the fraud.
Intuitively, if the strike price increases the value of the option decreases and thus more options
have to be granted if the budget constraint (5) has to bind. This result is shown formally in the
Appendix. Thus, from Lemma 1 we know that an increase in K reduces both eﬀort and fraud,
but an increase in λ increases both eﬀort and fraud. The following lemma describes the behavior
of the fraud to eﬀort ratio as the strike price K increases.
Lemma 2 The fraud to eﬀort ratio is a continuous and increasing function of the strike price
K.
Thus, an increase in the strike price K leads to an increase in the fraud to eﬀort ratio. In other
words, the manager engages relatively more in fraudulent behavior than in productive activities
as the strike price increases. This has important and direct consequences on the optimal choice of
the strike price K and the corresponding compensation package (λ,K) since the company’s long
run value depends positively on the eﬀort exerted by the manager, but it depends negatively on
the manager’s earnings management.
11 In particular we require W to be such that the participation constraint is always satisfied, i.e. E
?
U
?
?W2
??
≥
U0, where U0 represents the executive’s utility for a given outside option.
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The shareholder faces a trade-oﬀ, where gains from increased eﬀort have to be traded oﬀ
against long term losses due to fraudulent behavior. The following proposition describes the
optimal compensation structure.
Proposition 1 For δ > δ stock based compensation is optimal (K = 0), while for δ < δ stock
option based compensation is optimal (K > 0), where δ ≡ α2β
pφ
1−p .
In Proposition 1 a threshold level for δ is defined whereas for values of δ larger than this thresh-
old, stock based compensation is optimal while for lower values stock option based compensation
is optimal. This threshold level is increasing in the detection probability (p), the punishment in
case of detection (φ) and in the eﬀectiveness of eﬀort (α), while it is decreasing in the eﬀectiveness
of fraud (β).
The following comparative statics result for the optimal strike price can be proved.
Corollary 1 Consider the case where δ < δ. The optimal strike price (K) is decreasing in δ.
A larger long run negative eﬀect of fraud on the company’s value decreases the optimal strike
price K.
Note that, in the present model, conflicts between the shareholder and the manager are elim-
inated in this framework if both face the same time horizon. If stock options vest at time 3,
fraudulent behavior decreases not only the shareholder’s but also the manager’s wealth. In a
similar vein, a longer vesting period, i.e. a higher detection probability p, increases the range of
parameter values where stock option based compensation is optimal. This result is in accordance
with recent suggestions to increase the vesting period of stock options as a way to reduce conflicts
between shareholders and CEOs.
3 Conclusion
We studied the optimal managerial compensation package if shareholders can either grant stock
or stock options. The shareholder, in providing incentives, trades oﬀ gains from beneficial eﬀort
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against costs arising from fraudulent behavior. We find a threshold level for the cost of fraud, above
which stock based compensation is optimal. This threshold level is increasing in the detection
probability, the punishment in case of detection and in the eﬀectiveness of eﬀort, while it is
decreasing in the eﬀectiveness of fraud. Furthermore, we find that the fraud to eﬀort ratio is
an increasing function of the strike price and that the optimal strike price is decreasing in the
size of the long run negative eﬀects of fraud on the company’s value. Our analysis also suggests
that increasing the vesting period of stock options mitigates conflicts between shareholders and
managers, while the problem of the optimal vesting period remains an open one.
4 Appendix
Let us define X = min {S −K + αe, h} and X 0 = min {S −K + αe+ βf, h}, then
E
³eV2´ = 12h n(1− p) h(S −K + αe+ βf) (h+X 0) + h2−X022 i+
+p
h
(S −K + αe) (h+X) + h2−X22
io (6)
Three cases arise: (1) If X = X 0 = h, i.e. S −K + αe+ βf > S −K + αe > h; (2) If X 0 = h
and X = S −K + αe, i.e. S −K + αe+ βf > h > S −K + αe; and (3) X 0 = S −K + αe+ βf
and X = S −K + αe, i.e. h > S −K + αe + βf > S −K + αe. Note that we switch from one
case to the other changing the strike price K.
Proof of Lemma 1. Case (1) The manager’s problem is
max
e,f
λ (S −K + αe+ (1− p)βf)− e
2
2
− pφf
2
2
From the first order conditions (FOC) we obtain
e(1) = αλ (7)
f (1) = βλ
1− p
pφ
(8)
Case (2) The manager’s problem is
max
e,f
λ
"
(1− p) (S −K + αe+ βf) + p(S −K + αe+ h)
2
4h
#
− e
2
2
− pφf
2
2
9
From the FOC we obtain
e(2) = αλ
p (S −K) + (2− p)h
2h− pα2λ (9)
f (2) = βλ
1− p
pφ
(10)
If p(S−K)+(2−p)h2h−pα2λ = 1, e
(1) = e2 and S −K + αe(1) = S −K + αe(2) = h and thus the optimal
eﬀort level is continuous in K. Its is easy to see that e(2) is increasing in λ and deceasing in K,
and that f (2) is increasing in λ.
Case (3) The manager’s problem is
max
e,f
λ
4h
h
(1− p) (S −K + αe+ βf + h)2 + p (S −K + αe+ h)2
i
− e
2
2
− pφf
2
2
From the FOC, after rearranging terms, we obtain
e(3) = αλp
(S −K + h)
¡
2hφ− β2λ (1− p)
¢
2hpφ (2h− α2λ)− β2λ (1− p) (2h− pα2λ)
(11)
f (3) = βλ (1− p) 2h (S −K + h)
2hpφ (2h− α2λ)− β2λ (1− p) (2h− pα2λ)
(12)
In order to proof continuity of e and f we show that if S−K+αe(3)+βf (3) = h, then f (2) = f (3),
e(2) = e(3). Substituting (11) and (12) into condition S −K + αe(3) + βf (3) = h we obtain
(S −K + h) 2hpφ
2hpφ (2h− α2λ)− β2λ (1− p) (2h− pα2λ)
= 1 (13)
Setting f (2) = f (3) and rearranging terms we obtain (13). Instead of proving that e(2) = e(3), we
show that f
(2)
e(2) =
f(3)
e(2) . This latter condition can be rewritten as
2hφ
2hφ− β2λ (1− p)
=
2h− pα2λ
p (S −K) + (2− p)h
and thus rearranging terms (13) can be obtained. e(2) = e(3) follows from the fact that f (2) = f (1)
and f
(2)
e(2) =
f(3)
e(2) . Furthermore, simple algebra shows that
∂e(3)
∂λ > 0 and
∂f(3)
∂λ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. We are going to derive the fraud to eﬀort ratio Φ ≡ fe for each
of the three cases and show that Φ is increasing in K. In particular, we are going to derive
Φ(1) ≡ f
(1)
e(1) , for case (1), Φ
(2) ≡ f
(2)
e(2) for case (2) and Φ
(3) ≡ f
(3)
e(3) for case (3); we are going to
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show that Φ(1), Φ(2) and Φ(3) are continuous within each case and between cases and further that
Φ =
©
Φ(1),Φ(2),Φ(3)
ª
is increasing in K.
Case (1) From (7) and (8) we obtain the fraud to eﬀort ratio Φ(1) ≡ f
(1)
e(1) =
β
α
1−p
pφ , being
independent of λ and K.
Case (2) From (9) and (10) we obtain the fraud to eﬀort ratio
Φ(2) ≡ f
(2) (λ,K)
e(2) (λ)
=
β
α
1− p
pφ
2h− pα2λ
p (S −K) + (2− p)h (14)
For the continuity of the function Φ in K we observe that Φ(2) is continuous. Furthermore, if
p(S−K)+(2−p)h
2h−pα2λ = 1, e
(1) = e2 and S − K + αe(1) = S − K + αe(2) = h. It follows that, since
f (1) = f (2), Φ(1) = Φ(2) and consequently the function Φ is continuous.
In order to prove that Φ(2) is increasing in K we apply the implicit function theorem to the
budget constraint (5) and obtain
dλ
dK
= λ
p(S−K)+h(2−p)
2h−α2λp
E
³eV2´+ λα2 ³p(S−K)+(2−p)h2h−pα2λ ´2 + λ (1− p)2 β2 1pφ (15)
Taking the derivative of (14) with respect to K and taking into account that λ changes according
to (15) we obtain that the fraud to eﬀort ratio increases as long as
dλ
dK
<
2h− pα2λ
α2 (p (S −K) + (2− p)h) (16)
To prove that (16) is always satisfied we substitute (15) into the left-hand-side of inequality (16)
and obtain λE
³eV2´+ λ2 (1− p)2 β2 1pφ > 0, which is always satisfied.
Case (3) Using (11) and (12) the fraud-eﬀort ratio can be rewritten as follows
Φ(3) ≡ f
(3)
e(3)
=
β
α
1− p
p
2h
2hpφ− β2λp (1− p)
(17)
In order to prove that Φ is continuous in K we observe that function Φ(3) is continuous. Equality
Φ(2) = Φ(3) has already been proved in the proof of Lemma 1.
Finally we have to prove that Φ(3) is increasing in K. It is easy to see that
∂λE(?V2)
∂K < 0.
Furthermore, simple algebra shows that ∂e
(3)
∂λ > 0 and
∂f(3)
∂λ > 0 and consequently
∂λE(?V2)
∂λ > 0.
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Thus, applying the implicit function theorem to the budget constraint (5) we obtain dλdK > 0, and
thus we observe from (17) that Φ(3) is increasing in K.
Proof of Proposition 1. Case (1) Notice that for K = 0, i.e. stock based compensation,
we are always in this case. Using (7) and (8) we obtain
E
³eS3´ = S + λ ∙α2 − βδ 1− ppφ
¸
(18)
E
³eV2´ = S −K + λ"α2 + β2 (1− p)2pφ
#
(19)
Using (19), the budget constraint (5) and condition λ > 0 we obtain
λ =
− (S −K) +
q
(S −K)2 + 4ηW
2η
(20)
where η = α2 + β2 (1−p)
2
pφ . Note that λ is strictly increasing in K. Two situations arise: (i)
α2 > βδ 1−ppφ (ii) α
2 < βδ 1−ppφ . In case (i) the expected firm’s value at time 3 is increasing in λ.
Thus, since λ is increasing in K, there exists no solution for S − K + αe(1) > h. On the other
hand, in case (ii) the expected firm’s value at time 3 is decreasing in λ. Thus, since λ is strictly
increasing in K, the optimal strike price is K = 0.
In order to proof that K = 0 is an optimal solution if α2 < βδ 1−ppφ , we have to show that
dE(?S3)
dK is negative also in case (2) and (3).
Case (2). Note that E
³eS3´ is decreasing in K if f(2)K
e(2)K
≥ αδ , where f
(2)
K and e
(2)
K are the
derivatives taken with respect to K, taking into account that the budget constraint binds. If
α2 ≤ βδ 1−ppφ , then αe(1) ≤ δf (1). Since the fraud to eﬀort ratio is increasing in K we have that
α
δ ≤
f(2)
e(2) and furthermore we have that
f(2)K
e(2)K
≥ f
(2)
e(2) . Putting these results together we obtain that
f(2)K
e(2)K
≥ f
(2)
e(2) ≥
α
δ and thus the result is established.
Case (3). Note that E
³eS3´ is decreasing in K if f(3)K
e(3)K
≥ αδ , where f
(3)
K and e
(3)
K are the
derivatives taken with respect to K, taking into account that the budget constraint binds. If
α2 ≤ βδ 1−ppφ , then αe(1) ≤ δf (1). Since the fraud to eﬀort ratio is increasing in K we have that
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α
δ ≤
f(3)
e(3) and furthermore we have that
f(3)K
e(3)K
≥ f
(3)
e(3) . Putting these results together we obtain that
f(3)K
e(3)K
≥ f
(3)
e(3) ≥
α
δ and thus the result is established.
Proof of Corollary 1. fe is increasing in K implies that
fK
eK
≥ fe . Thus, in the optimal
strike price
dE(?S3)
dK = 0, where
fK
eK
= αδ >
f
e , and consequently E
³eS3´ = S + αe − δf > S. An
increase in δ reduces E
³eS3´, and thus, since fe is increasing in K, optimal K has to decrease.
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